Questions

1. The articles in a Minnesota newspaper were not targeted specifically toward a North Dakota audience (and in fact is specifically aimed outside the state) distinguishing the case from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (personal jurisdiction found over out-of-state magazine where publication was aimed at the forum), and the Defendant does not meet does the North Dakota Supreme Court's jurisdictional analysis, in which exercise of jurisdiction is determined by the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Internet. Does the North Dakota Supreme Court's jurisdictional analysis violate traditional due process principles of personal jurisdiction?

2. Although the Calder v. Jones “effects test,” initially seems to apply in this case, when you look further, there are problems. In Wagner v. Miskin, Miskin, a Minnesota editor, simply “linked to” and “posted” already public information on a Web newspaper. Miskin was made responsible for making Wagner embarrassed by linking to the local and national newspaper articles he himself had interviewed in. After airing his views in public and after casting himself into the limelight, Wagner made himself a limited purpose public figure. How much effect if any did this actually have on Wagner to make public that which he himself has already made public and does this case then meet the criteria of Calder v. Jones or was the North Dakota Supreme Court's jurisdictional analysis incorrect ?

3. The Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 grants the publisher of all alleged defamations absolute privilege and preempts all State law on the matter to the contrary. Should the “effects test,” established by this court for evaluating personal jurisdiction over nonresident authors of allegedly defamatory works, be read to require higher due process requirements for personal jurisdiction over editors who simply “post” or “link to “ public information or works of third parties other newspapers from other places that already appear on the Internet ?


4. The North Dakota Constitution does not provide absolute privilege in the case of quasi-judicial hearings. Here the North Dakota Court claimed “not heretofore recognized a judicially-crafted ‘quasi-judicial privilege’” although the Plaintiff clearly complains of damages that are within the scope of Defendant’s defense of a public quasi-judicial hearing. Following this constitutional deficiency, do the laws of a state that allows public quasi-judicial hearings to be retried for libel or defamation have a chilling effect on pro se defendants who need to speak in their own defense or speak to others while trying to discover facts to prove their innocence?

5. Does a state that allows trials of whistle-blowers for libel in the case of reports to authorities of public concern, and where witnesses of potential criminal activity who come forth are subjected to retaliation in the form of defamation and libel lawsuit(s), result in the effect of the chilling of free speech of witnesses?

6. Does the manipulation by the North Dakota Attorney General’s office of sending uniformed police officers to intimidate potential witnesses and the North Dakota Attorney General’s office ordering witnesses not to speak have a chilling effect on free speech in North Dakota?